On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties

Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of assigning n indivisible objects to n agents when each agent consumes one object and monetary transfers are not allowed. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that for n=3, the probabilistic serial mechanism is characterized by the three axioms of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-proofness. We show that this characterization does not extend to problems of arbitrary size; in particular, it does not hold for any n≥5. A number of general characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism have been obtained in the recent literature by replacing weak strategy-proofness with various invariance axioms while retaining ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness. We show that weak strategy-proofness is in fact logically independent of all invariance axioms used in these characterizations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)56-62
Number of pages7
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume90
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Nov 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Strategy-proofness
Incentive Mechanism
Axioms
Motivation
envy
Invariance
incentive
Indivisible
efficiency
Arbitrary
Incentive mechanism
Serials
Object
Envy-freeness
Ordinal efficiency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties. / Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Ünver, M. Utku.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 90, 01.11.2017, p. 56-62.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{14db9a6c259a47e2a6c729890e9bde90,
title = "On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties",
abstract = "This paper studies the problem of assigning n indivisible objects to n agents when each agent consumes one object and monetary transfers are not allowed. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that for n=3, the probabilistic serial mechanism is characterized by the three axioms of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-proofness. We show that this characterization does not extend to problems of arbitrary size; in particular, it does not hold for any n≥5. A number of general characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism have been obtained in the recent literature by replacing weak strategy-proofness with various invariance axioms while retaining ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness. We show that weak strategy-proofness is in fact logically independent of all invariance axioms used in these characterizations.",
author = "Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino and {\"U}nver, {M. Utku}",
year = "2017",
month = "11",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.005",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "56--62",
journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",
issn = "0165-4896",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - On characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism involving incentive and invariance properties

AU - Kesten, Onur

AU - Kurino, Morimitsu

AU - Ünver, M. Utku

PY - 2017/11/1

Y1 - 2017/11/1

N2 - This paper studies the problem of assigning n indivisible objects to n agents when each agent consumes one object and monetary transfers are not allowed. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that for n=3, the probabilistic serial mechanism is characterized by the three axioms of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-proofness. We show that this characterization does not extend to problems of arbitrary size; in particular, it does not hold for any n≥5. A number of general characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism have been obtained in the recent literature by replacing weak strategy-proofness with various invariance axioms while retaining ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness. We show that weak strategy-proofness is in fact logically independent of all invariance axioms used in these characterizations.

AB - This paper studies the problem of assigning n indivisible objects to n agents when each agent consumes one object and monetary transfers are not allowed. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) proved that for n=3, the probabilistic serial mechanism is characterized by the three axioms of ordinal efficiency, envy-freeness, and weak strategy-proofness. We show that this characterization does not extend to problems of arbitrary size; in particular, it does not hold for any n≥5. A number of general characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism have been obtained in the recent literature by replacing weak strategy-proofness with various invariance axioms while retaining ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness. We show that weak strategy-proofness is in fact logically independent of all invariance axioms used in these characterizations.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85009288388&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85009288388&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.005

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.005

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85009288388

VL - 90

SP - 56

EP - 62

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

SN - 0165-4896

ER -