On the neutrality of coalition formation in a pure bargaining problem

Haruo Imai, Naoki Watanabe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the sequential bargaining game à la Stahl-Binmore-Rubinstein with random proposers, juxtaposing an ex ante coalition formation stage to their bargaining game. On the basis of the expected outcomes in the negotiation over how to split a dollar, players can form coalitions in a sequential manner, within each of which they can redistribute their payoffs. It turns out that the grand coalition does form, and that each player receives his discounted expected payoff, which is obtained by playing as a single player in the negotiation, although there could be many equilibria in the bargaining stage.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)352-362
Number of pages11
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Volume56
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Sep
Externally publishedYes

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Coalition formation
Bargaining problem
Bargaining games
Neutrality
Sequential bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

On the neutrality of coalition formation in a pure bargaining problem. / Imai, Haruo; Watanabe, Naoki.

In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, 09.2005, p. 352-362.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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