On the operation of multiple matching markets

Hidekazu Anno, Morimitsu Kurino

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market for its design.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)166-185
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume100
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016 Nov 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Matching markets
Strategy-proof
Pareto
Market design
Acceptance
Top trading cycle

Keywords

  • Deferred acceptance rules
  • Market design
  • Second-best incentive compatibility
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Top trading cycles rules

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

On the operation of multiple matching markets. / Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 100, 01.11.2016, p. 166-185.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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