Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option

Yasunari Tamada, Tsung Sheng Tsai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers a two-stage sequential investment problem where the principal wishes to cancel the project if it fails in the first stage. Suppose that only the first-stage agent can observe the outcome in the first stage. There are two organizational forms to choose from: integration, where a single agent is in charge of investments in two stages; and separation, where two different agents are in charge of the two stages. Integration gives rise to a smaller wage cost of inducing high effort in both stages; however, in order to obtain the correct information to cancel the project, separation may have some advantage in terms of saving the information rent. We show that when the effort cost in the first stage is sufficiently small, the principal prefers separation because the first-stage agent has less incentive to lie about the outcome.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)631-641
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume25
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Jun

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Wages
Costs
Sequential investment
Cancellation
Charge
Organizational form
Incentives
Information rent

Keywords

  • Cancellation option
  • Optimal organization
  • Sequential investment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option. / Tamada, Yasunari; Tsai, Tsung Sheng.

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 25, No. 3, 06.2007, p. 631-641.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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