Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

Koji Ishibashi, Toyokazu Kaneko

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)213-231
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Volume95
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Dec

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Price competition
Quality competition
Public firm
Mixed duopoly
Partial privatization
Private firms
Profit maximization
Social welfare
Profit
Government
Product quality
Incentives

Keywords

  • Mixed oligopoly
  • Partial privatization
  • Quality competition
  • Strategic effect

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition. / Ishibashi, Koji; Kaneko, Toyokazu.

In: Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, Vol. 95, No. 3, 12.2008, p. 213-231.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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