Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival

Tatsuya Kitagawa; Yasushi Masuda; Masashi Umezawa

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.011

Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival

Tatsuya Kitagawa, Yasushi Masuda, Masashi Umezawa

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate a two-part tariff licensing contract that enables an incumbent innovator to license the technology for a new product to a potential rival, who may alternatively develop a compatible technology for an imperfectly substitutable product. We identify the optimal two-part tariff licensing contract based on the development cost incurred by the rival, the market parameter, and the substitution coefficient.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	227-231
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	123
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.011
Publication status	Published - 2014 May
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Differentiated cournot duopoly
Incumbent innovator
Licensing
Patent strength
Two-part tariff

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.011

Cite this

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AB - We investigate a two-part tariff licensing contract that enables an incumbent innovator to license the technology for a new product to a potential rival, who may alternatively develop a compatible technology for an imperfectly substitutable product. We identify the optimal two-part tariff licensing contract based on the development cost incurred by the rival, the market parameter, and the substitution coefficient.

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KW - Patent strength

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Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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