Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival

Tatsuya Kitagawa, Yasushi Masuda, Masashi Umezawa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate a two-part tariff licensing contract that enables an incumbent innovator to license the technology for a new product to a potential rival, who may alternatively develop a compatible technology for an imperfectly substitutable product. We identify the optimal two-part tariff licensing contract based on the development cost incurred by the rival, the market parameter, and the substitution coefficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)227-231
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume123
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 May 1

Keywords

  • Differentiated cournot duopoly
  • Incumbent innovator
  • Licensing
  • Patent strength
  • Two-part tariff

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this