Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival

Tatsuya Kitagawa, Yasushi Masuda, Masashi Umezawa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate a two-part tariff licensing contract that enables an incumbent innovator to license the technology for a new product to a potential rival, who may alternatively develop a compatible technology for an imperfectly substitutable product. We identify the optimal two-part tariff licensing contract based on the development cost incurred by the rival, the market parameter, and the substitution coefficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)227-231
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume123
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 May

Fingerprint

Licensing
Two-part tariff
Patents
Incumbents
Innovators
Costs
License
Substitution
Coefficients
New products

Keywords

  • Differentiated cournot duopoly
  • Incumbent innovator
  • Licensing
  • Patent strength
  • Two-part tariff

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival. / Kitagawa, Tatsuya; Masuda, Yasushi; Umezawa, Masashi.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 123, No. 2, 05.2014, p. 227-231.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kitagawa, Tatsuya ; Masuda, Yasushi ; Umezawa, Masashi. / Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival. In: Economics Letters. 2014 ; Vol. 123, No. 2. pp. 227-231.
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