Play It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning From Finitely repeated Dilemma Games

Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Often the fuller the reputational record people's actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn a reputation for cooperation. However, inability to ‘wipe clean’ one's past record might trap some agents who initially underappreciate reputation's value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a clean slate could have been followed by their ‘reforming’ themselves. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with endogenous, symmetric partner choice. We find that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although earlier end-game behaviour is observed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1069-1095
Number of pages27
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume127
Issue number602
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Jun
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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