Product line competition and ICT investments

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this paper, we study strategic product line designs under duopoly. While the availability of a rich variety of products may attract consumers, it may also lead to confusion in the purchase decision-making process resulting in consumer dissatisfaction. Firms are thus motivated to offer their products with ICT tools in order to supply consumers with sufficient communication about them. We present a simple game theoretic model to analyze the impact on product line decisions of the cost of developing these tools, which may even be affected even by the rival's product line. We show that the ICT progress in solving consumers' confusion due to a firm's own products enlarges the profit gap between asymmetric firms. In contrast, it is shown that the ICT progress in solving consumers' confusion arising from a comparison with the rival's products reduces the profit gap between them. The cost asymmetry between two firms makes both of these opposite effects more robust.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame Theory
Subtitle of host publicationStrategies, Equilibra and Theorems
PublisherNova Science Publishers, Inc.
Pages217-230
Number of pages14
ISBN (Print)9781604568448
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Dec 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)
  • Mathematics(all)

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    Matsubayashi, N. (2009). Product line competition and ICT investments. In Game Theory: Strategies, Equilibra and Theorems (pp. 217-230). Nova Science Publishers, Inc..