Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Louisa Putterman, Jean Robert Tyran, Kenjua Kamei

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

94 Citations (Scopus)


The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1213-1222
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Issue number9-10
Publication statusPublished - 2011 Oct
Externally publishedYes


  • Experiment
  • Formal sanction
  • Penalty
  • Public good
  • Voluntary contribution
  • Voting

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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