TY - JOUR
T1 - Public goods game with ambiguous threshold
AU - Kishishita, Daiki
AU - Ozaki, Hiroyuki
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - Various collective action problems can be described as a discrete public goods game with a threshold. In this game, players may be reluctant to contribute to the provision of public goods when the threshold value is uncertain. We derive equilibria when players face ambiguity (i.e., Knightian uncertainty) on the threshold value by using Choquet expected utility. Furthermore, we show that in a class of neo-additive capacities, an increase in ambiguity decreases the equilibrium maximal number of contributors, irrespective of players’ ambiguity-attitudes. This contrasts to what McBride (2006) shows when the probability distribution is known.
AB - Various collective action problems can be described as a discrete public goods game with a threshold. In this game, players may be reluctant to contribute to the provision of public goods when the threshold value is uncertain. We derive equilibria when players face ambiguity (i.e., Knightian uncertainty) on the threshold value by using Choquet expected utility. Furthermore, we show that in a class of neo-additive capacities, an increase in ambiguity decreases the equilibrium maximal number of contributors, irrespective of players’ ambiguity-attitudes. This contrasts to what McBride (2006) shows when the probability distribution is known.
KW - Ambiguity
KW - Choquet expected utility
KW - Collective action
KW - Public goods
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85083286918&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85083286918&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109165
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109165
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85083286918
VL - 191
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
M1 - 109165
ER -