Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable

Tingting Fu; Yunan Ji; Kenju Kamei; Louis Putterman

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016

Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable

Tingting Fu, Yunan Ji, Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experiment without peer punishment and with one order of punishment to ones in which subjects can be punished for punishing or for failing to punish. Our treatments with higher-order punishment achieve as much improvement in cooperation as those with only one punishment stage. We see evidence of social norms in action, but no evidence of punishing failure to punish. These results suggest that higher-order punishment is neither critical to nor a major deterrent to cooperation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	84-87
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	154
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016
Publication status	Published - 2017 May 1
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Cooperation
Higher order punishment
Punishment
Retaliation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016

Cite this

@article{740126d5d537494a8ab539cbfd18bc8c,

title = "Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable",

abstract = "Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experiment without peer punishment and with one order of punishment to ones in which subjects can be punished for punishing or for failing to punish. Our treatments with higher-order punishment achieve as much improvement in cooperation as those with only one punishment stage. We see evidence of social norms in action, but no evidence of punishing failure to punish. These results suggest that higher-order punishment is neither critical to nor a major deterrent to cooperation.",

keywords = "Cooperation, Higher order punishment, Punishment, Retaliation",

author = "Tingting Fu and Yunan Ji and Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017",

year = "2017",

month = may,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016",

language = "English",

volume = "154",

pages = "84--87",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable

AU - Fu, Tingting

AU - Ji, Yunan

AU - Kamei, Kenju

AU - Putterman, Louis

PY - 2017/5/1

Y1 - 2017/5/1

N2 - Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experiment without peer punishment and with one order of punishment to ones in which subjects can be punished for punishing or for failing to punish. Our treatments with higher-order punishment achieve as much improvement in cooperation as those with only one punishment stage. We see evidence of social norms in action, but no evidence of punishing failure to punish. These results suggest that higher-order punishment is neither critical to nor a major deterrent to cooperation.

AB - Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punish punishers harm cooperation and its benefits by deterring first order punishment and wasting resources? We compare treatments of a decision experiment without peer punishment and with one order of punishment to ones in which subjects can be punished for punishing or for failing to punish. Our treatments with higher-order punishment achieve as much improvement in cooperation as those with only one punishment stage. We see evidence of social norms in action, but no evidence of punishing failure to punish. These results suggest that higher-order punishment is neither critical to nor a major deterrent to cooperation.

KW - Cooperation

KW - Higher order punishment

KW - Punishment

KW - Retaliation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85014479657&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85014479657&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85014479657

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 154

SP - 84

EP - 87

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this