Real-Time Pricing Mechanism for Electricity Market with Built-In Incentive for Participation

Toru Namerikawa, Norio Okubo, Ryutaro Sato, Yoshihiro Okawa, Masahiro Ono

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

50 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to design a distributed real-time electricity pricing mechanism. Our approach is novel in that it guarantees individual rationality, meaning that it provides suppliers and consumers with a guaranteed incentive to participate in the real-time pricing market. Such an incentive is devised by offering a time-varying, situation-dependent subsidy that guarantees that a supplier/consumer profits by switching from a fixed-price contract to the real-time pricing contract. Although we assume that suppliers and consumers decide supply and demand quantities in a fully distributed manner to maximize their own profit, the proposed mechanism guarantees under moderate conditions that the market converges through an iterative process to a Nash equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. Furthermore, in order to guarantee safe operation of an electrical grid, our pricing mechanism increases stability of load frequency control, and at the same time, achieves supply-demand equilibrium by explicitly taking into account an equality constraint through dual decomposition method. We empirically demonstrate by simulations the individual rationality of the proposed mechanism as well as the convergence to supply-demand equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Article number7154489
Pages (from-to)2714-2724
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Volume6
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Nov 1

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Costs
Profitability
Electricity
Decomposition
Power markets

Keywords

  • Dual decomposition
  • game theory
  • real-time pricing
  • smart grids

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Real-Time Pricing Mechanism for Electricity Market with Built-In Incentive for Participation. / Namerikawa, Toru; Okubo, Norio; Sato, Ryutaro; Okawa, Yoshihiro; Ono, Masahiro.

In: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, Vol. 6, No. 6, 7154489, 01.11.2015, p. 2714-2724.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Namerikawa, Toru ; Okubo, Norio ; Sato, Ryutaro ; Okawa, Yoshihiro ; Ono, Masahiro. / Real-Time Pricing Mechanism for Electricity Market with Built-In Incentive for Participation. In: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. 2015 ; Vol. 6, No. 6. pp. 2714-2724.
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