Regional economic integration and article XXIV of the GATT

Junichi Goto, Koichi Hamada

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the economic impact of regionalism under the realistic assumptions of constant tariffs and asymmetric bloc formation. As an extension of the Krugman framework, the impact is decomposed into several components, each of which has a clear economic implication. Economic integration definitely worsens outsiders' welfare even if the external tariffs of the bloc are unraised. Bloc members' welfare first increases with the expansion of the bloc; but when about half of the world is united into the bloc, welfare begins to decrease. Simulation results shed some light on the incentive structure of major participants, who face various configurations of regional integration.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)555-570
Number of pages16
JournalReview of International Economics
Volume7
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1999 Nov
Externally publishedYes

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GATT
economic integration
regional integration
welfare
regionalism
economic impact
incentive
economics
simulation
tariff
world

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Development

Cite this

Regional economic integration and article XXIV of the GATT. / Goto, Junichi; Hamada, Koichi.

In: Review of International Economics, Vol. 7, No. 4, 11.1999, p. 555-570.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Goto, Junichi ; Hamada, Koichi. / Regional economic integration and article XXIV of the GATT. In: Review of International Economics. 1999 ; Vol. 7, No. 4. pp. 555-570.
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