@article{60e44b2da2c64e56aee739e65eba0311,
title = "REPUTATION TRANSMISSION WITHOUT BENEFIT TO THE REPORTER: A BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNING OF MARKETS IN EXPERIMENTAL FOCUS",
abstract = "Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. (JEL C91, D03, D63).",
author = "Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman",
note = "Funding Information: ∗Funding for this project came from the Murata Science Foundation, with additional support from Brown University. We wish to thank Cheewadhanaraks Matanaporn for programming of the experiment software, and Benjamin Chowdhury, Kathleen Hu, and especially Hui Wen Ng for assistance with the literature review, theoretical analysis, and data analysis. We also thank Yan Chen for her hospitality while the authors conducted the experiments at the University of Michigan, and we thank two anonymous reviewers, Pedro Dal B{\'o} and other participants at the Brown University theory lunch, and participants at the 2015 Social Dilemmas Conference at Brown, and at the ESA World Meeting in Sydney, Australia in July 2015 for helpful comments. Kamei: Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LB, UK. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 Western Economic Association International",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1111/ecin.12477",
language = "English",
volume = "56",
pages = "158--172",
journal = "Economic Inquiry",
issn = "0095-2583",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",
}