REPUTATION TRANSMISSION WITHOUT BENEFIT TO THE REPORTER: A BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNING OF MARKETS IN EXPERIMENTAL FOCUS

Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions. (JEL C91, D03, D63).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)158-172
Number of pages15
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume56
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jan
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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