Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes

Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of licensees that maximizes licensees' total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor's revenue is uniquely determined.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)505-523
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume37
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008 Dec
Externally publishedYes

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Keywords

  • Bargaining set
  • Coalition structure
  • Core
  • Licensing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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