Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities

Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We provide various extensions of strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions and examine their impact on standard solutions. We show that some efficient and fair solutions, such as the envy-free solution, satisfy certain extensions of strategy-proofness. We also establish an impossibility result on extended strategy-proofness that is defined in terms of expected utility.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)53-68
Number of pages16
JournalMathematical social sciences
Volume53
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Extended strategy-proofness
  • Fair allocation
  • Indivisible goods
  • Stochastic choice
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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