Abstract
This paper studies strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in the problem of fairly allocating homogeneous indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We provide various extensions of strategy-proofness to multi-valued solutions and examine their impact on standard solutions. We show that some efficient and fair solutions, such as the envy-free solution, satisfy certain extensions of strategy-proofness. We also establish an impossibility result on extended strategy-proofness that is defined in terms of expected utility.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 53-68 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Mathematical social sciences |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 Jan |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Extended strategy-proofness
- Fair allocation
- Indivisible goods
- Stochastic choice
- Strategy-proofness
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences(all)
- Psychology(all)
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty