Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule

Toyotaka Sakai; Takuma Wakayama

doi:10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2

Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule

Toyotaka Sakai, Takuma Wakayama

Faculty of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the division problem with single-peaked preferences, an allocation rule is strategy-proof for same tops if no one can gain by reporting a false preference relation having the true peak. This new condition is so weak that it is implied by strategy-proofness and tops-only. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying this mild property under efficiency and envy-freeness. We then analyze how largely the preference domain can be extended with admitting a rule satisfying the three axioms, and show that the single-plateaued domain is the unique such maximal domain.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	287-301
Number of pages	15
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	72
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2
Publication status	Published - 2012 Mar

Keywords

Strategy-proofness
Strategy-proofness for same tops
Tops-only
Uniform rule

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Decision Sciences(all)
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
Applied Psychology
Social Sciences(all)
Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
Computer Science Applications

Access to Document

10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2

Cite this

@article{7638ff55a2f9461e950ebb2b940a546b,

title = "Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule",

abstract = "In the division problem with single-peaked preferences, an allocation rule is strategy-proof for same tops if no one can gain by reporting a false preference relation having the true peak. This new condition is so weak that it is implied by strategy-proofness and tops-only. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying this mild property under efficiency and envy-freeness. We then analyze how largely the preference domain can be extended with admitting a rule satisfying the three axioms, and show that the single-plateaued domain is the unique such maximal domain.",

keywords = "Strategy-proofness, Strategy-proofness for same tops, Tops-only, Uniform rule",

author = "Toyotaka Sakai and Takuma Wakayama",

note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgments We gratefully acknowledge two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Sakai{\textquoteright}s research is partially supported by KAKENHI (22730158). Wakayama{\textquoteright}s research is partially supported by KAKENHI (22730165, 22330061).",

year = "2012",

month = mar,

doi = "10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2",

language = "English",

volume = "72",

pages = "287--301",

journal = "Theory and Decision",

issn = "0040-5833",

publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule

AU - Sakai, Toyotaka

AU - Wakayama, Takuma

N1 - Funding Information: Acknowledgments We gratefully acknowledge two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Sakai’s research is partially supported by KAKENHI (22730158). Wakayama’s research is partially supported by KAKENHI (22730165, 22330061).

PY - 2012/3

Y1 - 2012/3

N2 - In the division problem with single-peaked preferences, an allocation rule is strategy-proof for same tops if no one can gain by reporting a false preference relation having the true peak. This new condition is so weak that it is implied by strategy-proofness and tops-only. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying this mild property under efficiency and envy-freeness. We then analyze how largely the preference domain can be extended with admitting a rule satisfying the three axioms, and show that the single-plateaued domain is the unique such maximal domain.

AB - In the division problem with single-peaked preferences, an allocation rule is strategy-proof for same tops if no one can gain by reporting a false preference relation having the true peak. This new condition is so weak that it is implied by strategy-proofness and tops-only. We show that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying this mild property under efficiency and envy-freeness. We then analyze how largely the preference domain can be extended with admitting a rule satisfying the three axioms, and show that the single-plateaued domain is the unique such maximal domain.

KW - Strategy-proofness

KW - Strategy-proofness for same tops

KW - Tops-only

KW - Uniform rule

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84857039529&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84857039529&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2

DO - 10.1007/s11238-011-9283-2

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84857039529

SN - 0040-5833

VL - 72

SP - 287

EP - 301

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

IS - 3

ER -

Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this