Subgame-perfect free trade networks in a four-country model

Masaki Iimura, Tatsuhiro Shichijo, Toru Hokari

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Goyal and Joshi (2006, Int Econ Review) apply the notion of "pairwise stable networks" introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, J Econ Theory) to a model of free trade network formation, and show that (i) every pairwise stable network is either complete or almost complete (with all countries except one forming direct links), and (ii) the complete network maximizes global welfare. In this note, we use essentially the same model as their model with four countries, and investigate which network is more likely to be realized than others by considering a dynamic process introduced by Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)650-657
Number of pages8
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume30
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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Free trade
Global network
Network formation
Dynamic process

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Subgame-perfect free trade networks in a four-country model. / Iimura, Masaki; Shichijo, Tatsuhiro; Hokari, Toru.

In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2010, p. 650-657.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Iimura, M, Shichijo, T & Hokari, T 2010, 'Subgame-perfect free trade networks in a four-country model', Economics Bulletin, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 650-657.
Iimura, Masaki ; Shichijo, Tatsuhiro ; Hokari, Toru. / Subgame-perfect free trade networks in a four-country model. In: Economics Bulletin. 2010 ; Vol. 30, No. 1. pp. 650-657.
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