Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements

Masaki Iimura, Seiji Murakoshi, Toru Hokari

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a model of market sharing agreements introduced by Belleframme and Bloch (2004, Int Econ Review), an investigate which networks are likely to be realized when the number of the players is three.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume3
Issue number7
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Jan 25
Externally publishedYes

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Dynamic process
Network formation
Finite horizon

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements. / Iimura, Masaki; Murakoshi, Seiji; Hokari, Toru.

In: Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 7, 25.01.2007.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Iimura, M, Murakoshi, S & Hokari, T 2007, 'Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements', Economics Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 7.
Iimura, Masaki ; Murakoshi, Seiji ; Hokari, Toru. / Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements. In: Economics Bulletin. 2007 ; Vol. 3, No. 7.
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