Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts

Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, Jun Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We examine the roles of (slightly weakened versions of) the observable substitutability condition and the observable substitutability across doctors condition of Hatfield et al. (2021) in many-to-many matching with contracts. We modify the standard cumulative offer algorithm to find stable outcomes and prove new results on the existence of stable outcomes. It is remarkable that size monotonicity at the offer-proposing side is essential for the existence result under observable substitutability across doctors.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)503-512
Number of pages10
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume129
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021 Sep
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cumulative offer algorithm
  • Many-to-many matching
  • Observable substitutability
  • Size monotonicity
  • Stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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