The Asian financial crisis and Japanese policy reactions

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Robert Rubin, the US Treasury Secretary, was reported to have bluntly criticised Japan for lacking a sense of urgency after his meeting with Kiichi Miyazawa, the Japanese Finance Minister, in September 1998. In fact, the US–Japan dialogue on economic issues was highly acrimonious in early 1998, and American media were fraught with comments that ridiculed Japanese economic policy. In essence, they grumbled that the Japanese government was pursuing fiscal retrenchment and did nothing to rescue troubled banks, while the Japanese economy came under deflationary pressure and neighbouring countries were in the thick of the financial crisis. In view of the fact that the same media had, just four to five years before, described Japan as an invincible economic giant that even threatened the American economic supremacy, it is hard to believe that they were referring to the same economy. In fact, the Japanese government was far from inactive during the Asian crisis. It made the largest financial contribution, organised a rescue package and even proposed a new regional mechanism for financial co-operation. Thus, it was surprising the United States, which was even unwilling to appropriate money for IMF resources through a quota increase, should criticise Japan. But Japan's international efforts were hampered by its poor economic performance. It had its own financial crisis at home, and was thus unable to help the crisis-stricken economies by absorbing more of their exports. It was well known that the Japanese financial system became increasingly fragile under the heavy load of bad loans.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternational Financial Governance Under Stress
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages223-240
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9780511492525, 0521817323, 9780521817325
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003 Jan 1

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Asian financial crisis
Japan
Economics
Financial crisis
Government
Financial system
Fiscal
Economic policy
Finance
Japanese economy
Financial cooperation
Retrenchment
Economic performance
Resources
Loans
Asian crisis

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Tadokoro, M. (2003). The Asian financial crisis and Japanese policy reactions. In International Financial Governance Under Stress (pp. 223-240). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492525

The Asian financial crisis and Japanese policy reactions. / Tadokoro, Masayuki.

International Financial Governance Under Stress. Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 223-240.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Tadokoro, M 2003, The Asian financial crisis and Japanese policy reactions. in International Financial Governance Under Stress. Cambridge University Press, pp. 223-240. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492525
Tadokoro M. The Asian financial crisis and Japanese policy reactions. In International Financial Governance Under Stress. Cambridge University Press. 2003. p. 223-240 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492525
Tadokoro, Masayuki. / The Asian financial crisis and Japanese policy reactions. International Financial Governance Under Stress. Cambridge University Press, 2003. pp. 223-240
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