Abstract
Public decision making often involves the problem of fairly assigning one indivisible object to agents with monetary transfers. An example is the choice of the location of a garbage incineration facility where the accepting district should receive fair compensations from other districts. In this problem, we show that for broad classes of solutions satisfying a welfare lower bound and an efficiency-oriented condition, the set of equilibrium allocations in the manipulation game associated with a given solution coincides with the set of all envy-free allocations. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson's equivalence result for a class of envy-free solutions. Our result covers the Shapley value, which is not covered by Tadenuma and Thomson's result.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 993-1011 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 Dec |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Finance
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
The manipulability of fair solutions in assignment of an indivisible object with monetary transfers. / Fujinaka, Yuji; Sakai, Toyotaka.
In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, No. 6, 12.2007, p. 993-1011.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The manipulability of fair solutions in assignment of an indivisible object with monetary transfers
AU - Fujinaka, Yuji
AU - Sakai, Toyotaka
PY - 2007/12
Y1 - 2007/12
N2 - Public decision making often involves the problem of fairly assigning one indivisible object to agents with monetary transfers. An example is the choice of the location of a garbage incineration facility where the accepting district should receive fair compensations from other districts. In this problem, we show that for broad classes of solutions satisfying a welfare lower bound and an efficiency-oriented condition, the set of equilibrium allocations in the manipulation game associated with a given solution coincides with the set of all envy-free allocations. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson's equivalence result for a class of envy-free solutions. Our result covers the Shapley value, which is not covered by Tadenuma and Thomson's result.
AB - Public decision making often involves the problem of fairly assigning one indivisible object to agents with monetary transfers. An example is the choice of the location of a garbage incineration facility where the accepting district should receive fair compensations from other districts. In this problem, we show that for broad classes of solutions satisfying a welfare lower bound and an efficiency-oriented condition, the set of equilibrium allocations in the manipulation game associated with a given solution coincides with the set of all envy-free allocations. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson's equivalence result for a class of envy-free solutions. Our result covers the Shapley value, which is not covered by Tadenuma and Thomson's result.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=35348929876&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00341.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00341.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:35348929876
VL - 9
SP - 993
EP - 1011
JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory
SN - 1467-9779
IS - 6
ER -