The manipulability of fair solutions in assignment of an indivisible object with monetary transfers

Yuji Fujinaka, Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Public decision making often involves the problem of fairly assigning one indivisible object to agents with monetary transfers. An example is the choice of the location of a garbage incineration facility where the accepting district should receive fair compensations from other districts. In this problem, we show that for broad classes of solutions satisfying a welfare lower bound and an efficiency-oriented condition, the set of equilibrium allocations in the manipulation game associated with a given solution coincides with the set of all envy-free allocations. This generalizes Tadenuma and Thomson's equivalence result for a class of envy-free solutions. Our result covers the Shapley value, which is not covered by Tadenuma and Thomson's result.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)993-1011
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume9
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Dec
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

envy
garbage removal
district
equivalence
manipulation
welfare
decision making
efficiency
Assignment
Manipulability
Indivisible objects
Envy-free
Associated game
Decision making
Lower bounds
Manipulation
Incineration
Equivalence
Shapley value

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

The manipulability of fair solutions in assignment of an indivisible object with monetary transfers. / Fujinaka, Yuji; Sakai, Toyotaka.

In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 9, No. 6, 12.2007, p. 993-1011.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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