The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

Yuji Fujinaka, Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)


It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an e{open}-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small e{open} > 0.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)325-348
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes



  • Consequence of strategic manipulation
  • Existence of e{open}-Nash equilibrium
  • Indivisible good
  • Mechanism design
  • Nash implementation
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this