The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

Yuji Fujinaka, Toyotaka Sakai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an e{open}-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small e{open} > 0.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)325-348
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume38
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Indivisible
envy
manipulation
Manipulation
budget
Nash Equilibrium
Game
Envy-free
Class
Object
Nash equilibrium

Keywords

  • Consequence of strategic manipulation
  • Existence of e{open}-Nash equilibrium
  • Indivisible good
  • Mechanism design
  • Nash implementation
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation. / Fujinaka, Yuji; Sakai, Toyotaka.

In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2009, p. 325-348.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{3f91c58780a4422dac520037efb1f8d8,
title = "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation",
abstract = "It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an e{open}-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small e{open} > 0.",
keywords = "Consequence of strategic manipulation, Existence of e{open}-Nash equilibrium, Indivisible good, Mechanism design, Nash implementation, Strategy-proofness",
author = "Yuji Fujinaka and Toyotaka Sakai",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "325--348",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

AU - Fujinaka, Yuji

AU - Sakai, Toyotaka

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an e{open}-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small e{open} > 0.

AB - It is well known that any decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free mechanism for allocating a single object with transfers is vulnerable to manipulation. In this paper we examine whether the possible manipulations can have a serious impact on the outcome. Specifically, we examine which allocations are realized in the direct revelation game of any rule satisfying certain normative properties. For this class of rules we show that decision efficient, budget balanced, and envy-free allocations are the only ones realized through an e{open}-Nash equilibrium for any sufficiently small e{open} > 0.

KW - Consequence of strategic manipulation

KW - Existence of e{open}-Nash equilibrium

KW - Indivisible good

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Nash implementation

KW - Strategy-proofness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=70350037819&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=70350037819&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7

DO - 10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7

M3 - Article

VL - 38

SP - 325

EP - 348

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 3

ER -