Abstract
Kaplan (1994) concludes that the relationship between top pay and stock performance in Japan is similar to that in the USA. Using a new and comprehensive data set that includes presidents' stock and their stock option holdings, this study estimates the sensitivity of Japanese presidents' wealth to shareholder wealth in the period 1977-2000. Contrary to the commonly held belief that Japanese corporate governance is becoming more like that in the USA, the results show that pay-performance sensitivity actually decreased substantially after 1990. In 2000, Japanese presidents received $US22,100 when stock returns increased from -2.1% to 14.8%.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 401-418 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Japanese Economic Review |
Volume | 59 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2008 |
Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
The relationship between financial incentives for company presidents and firm performance in Japan. / Kubo, Katsuyuki; Saito, Takuji.
In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2008, p. 401-418.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The relationship between financial incentives for company presidents and firm performance in Japan
AU - Kubo, Katsuyuki
AU - Saito, Takuji
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - Kaplan (1994) concludes that the relationship between top pay and stock performance in Japan is similar to that in the USA. Using a new and comprehensive data set that includes presidents' stock and their stock option holdings, this study estimates the sensitivity of Japanese presidents' wealth to shareholder wealth in the period 1977-2000. Contrary to the commonly held belief that Japanese corporate governance is becoming more like that in the USA, the results show that pay-performance sensitivity actually decreased substantially after 1990. In 2000, Japanese presidents received $US22,100 when stock returns increased from -2.1% to 14.8%.
AB - Kaplan (1994) concludes that the relationship between top pay and stock performance in Japan is similar to that in the USA. Using a new and comprehensive data set that includes presidents' stock and their stock option holdings, this study estimates the sensitivity of Japanese presidents' wealth to shareholder wealth in the period 1977-2000. Contrary to the commonly held belief that Japanese corporate governance is becoming more like that in the USA, the results show that pay-performance sensitivity actually decreased substantially after 1990. In 2000, Japanese presidents received $US22,100 when stock returns increased from -2.1% to 14.8%.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=56549083022&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=56549083022&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00420.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2008.00420.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:56549083022
VL - 59
SP - 401
EP - 418
JO - Japanese Economic Review
JF - Japanese Economic Review
SN - 1352-4739
IS - 4
ER -