The role of visibility on third party punishment actions for the enforcement of social norms

Kenju Kamei

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents results from a prisoner's dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one's defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player's action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma's incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)193-197
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume171
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Oct
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Dilemma
  • Experiment
  • Social norms
  • Third party punishment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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