Abstract
Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are 'stretched' by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and nonoverboarded outside directors.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 775-798 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | Journal of Management Studies |
Volume | 41 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2004 Jul 1 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation