Abstract
Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are 'stretched' by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and nonoverboarded outside directors.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 775-798 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Journal of Management Studies |
| Volume | 41 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2004 Jul |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation
- Strategy and Management
Cite this
Too busy to serve? an examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors. / Harris, Ira G.; Shimizu, Katsuhiko.
In: Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 41, No. 5, 07.2004, p. 775-798.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Too busy to serve? an examination of the Influence of Overboarded Directors
AU - Harris, Ira G.
AU - Shimizu, Katsuhiko
PY - 2004/7
Y1 - 2004/7
N2 - Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are 'stretched' by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and nonoverboarded outside directors.
AB - Overboarded directors (i.e., those serving on too many boards) have come under recent attack. The accusation is that such directors are 'stretched' by several directorships and therefore cannot fulfil their governance responsibility. This study investigates the impact of overboarded directors upon key strategic decisions such as corporate acquisitions. Based on our examination of acquisition outcomes, we found that such directors are important sources of knowledge and enhance acquisition performance. Moreover, they represent an important complement to inside and nonoverboarded outside directors.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=3142748475&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=3142748475&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00453.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00453.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:3142748475
VL - 41
SP - 775
EP - 798
JO - Journal of Management Studies
JF - Journal of Management Studies
SN - 0022-2380
IS - 5
ER -