Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism that satisfies non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness, and the only mechanism that satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where "sd" stands for first-order stochastic dominance).

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)253-277
Number of pages25
JournalTheoretical Economics
Volume9
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jan 1
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Serials
Axiomatic approach
Robustness
Stochastic dominance
Fairness
Random assignment
Invariance
Lottery
Envy-freeness
Indivisible objects

Keywords

  • Ordinal fairness
  • Probabilistic serial
  • Random assignment
  • Sd-efficiency
  • Sd-envy-freeness
  • Weak invariance
  • Weak truncation robustness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism. / Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Ünver, M. Utku.

In: Theoretical Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 01.01.2014, p. 253-277.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Hashimoto, T, Hirata, D, Kesten, O, Kurino, M & Ünver, MU 2014, 'Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism', Theoretical Economics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 253-277. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1010
Hashimoto, Tadashi ; Hirata, Daisuke ; Kesten, Onur ; Kurino, Morimitsu ; Ünver, M. Utku. / Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism. In: Theoretical Economics. 2014 ; Vol. 9, No. 1. pp. 253-277.
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