Abstract
The US approach toward China shifted from engagement to competition, and it has coincided with the near-simultaneous breakthrough of advanced technologies in a whole host of areas ranging from artificial intelligence to synthetic biology. As a result, the United States is competing with China to apply these advanced technologies for military and industrial purposes, and, at the same time, competing in third countries over dominance in digital network infrastructure. The current article will illustrate Chinese efforts and US countermeasures that are unfolding in the form of military technological competition, industrial technological competition, and the digital network competition in order to argue that the US shift toward competition is not only about Chinese discriminatory and unreasonable acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer and cyber intrusions, but a contest for supremacy over the next generation of military, economic and information/data dominance that could impact the relative legitimacy of political and socio-economic system of the two states.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 77-120 |
| Number of pages | 44 |
| Journal | Asia-Pacific Review |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2019 Jan 2 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations
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US Technological Competition with China : The Military, Industrial and Digital Network Dimensions. / Mori, Satoru.
In: Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, 02.01.2019, p. 77-120.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - US Technological Competition with China
T2 - The Military, Industrial and Digital Network Dimensions
AU - Mori, Satoru
N1 - Funding Information: It has been reported that the Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative issued jointly by China’s National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce in March 2015 referred to an “information silk road” to include the construction of cross-border fiber optic cables and mobile networks and the development of e-commerce between China and BRI countries. 76 Three months later, Lu Wei, then director of the Cyberspace Administration of China made reference to a “digital silk road” at the China-EU Digital Cooperation Roundtable in July 2015 held in Brussels where it appeared that it encompasses a wide range of sectors from e-commerce and telecommunication to scientific cooperation and the smart economy. 77 The 13th Five Year Plan issued in 2016 contained “a specific section on improving internet and telecommunications link across BRI countries.” 78 The Plan emphasized “the creation of land and sea cable infrastructure, an Internet Silk Road between China and Arab States, and the creation of a China-ASEAN information harbor.” 79 The actual ICT infrastructure projects that are pursued by Chinese companies cover areas such as telecommunication infrastructure, submarine fiber optic cables, cloud computing, e-commerce, smart cities, among others. It has been pointed out that Chinese information technologies “are designed to supplement the Belt and Road’s physical infrastructure, while introducing common technical standards in participating nations, most of which lack rudimentary internet facilities.” 80 Comprehensive documentation of ICT Chinese projects around the world falls beyond the scope of the current article, but Chinese firms are quite active at expanding into foreign markets and concluding partnerships with global companies. Table 5 Funding Information: 1 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States , December 2017, p.27. 2 U.S. Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States , January 2018, p.1. 3 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Competing with China,” Survival , Vol.60, No.3 (2018), pp. 7–64; Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs , Vol.97, No.2 (March/April 2018), pp.60-70. 4 Robert Sutter, “Push Back: America’s New China Strategy,” The Diplomat , November 2, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/pushback-americas-new-china-strategy/ (accessed on March 11, 2019) 5 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of the 1974 , March 22, 2018 (hereafter Section 301 Findings ); Ibid, Update Concerning China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation , November 20, 2018. 6 Satoru Mori, “US Defense Innovation and Artificial Intelligence,” Asia Pacific Review , Vol.25, No.2 (December 2018), p.16-44. 7 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, December 6, 2018, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf (accessed April 15, 2019) 8 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks on ‘America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” July 30, 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm (accessed March 11, 2019) 9 The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China,” October 4, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/ (accessed on March 11, 2019) 10 Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.38, No.3 (October 2015), pp.95-122; Campbell and Ratner, “The China Reckoning”; Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “After the Responsible Stakeholder, What? Debating America’s China Strategy,” Texas National Security Review , Vol.2, No.2 (February 2019), https://tnsr.org/2019/02/after-the-responsible-stakeholder-what-debating-americas-china-strategy-2/ (accessed on March 20, 2019) 11 US-China Business Council, 2018 Member Survey , https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/2018_ucsbc_member_survey_final.pdf (accessed on April 6, 2019). 12 James Chau, “Condemned to Cooperate, or Be Condemned: An Interview with Professor Joseph Nye,” China-US Focus , March 29, 2019, https://www.chinausfocus.com/podcasts/2019/0326/17933.html (accessed on April 6, 2019). 13 USTR, Section 301 Findings , Appendix C. 14 John Garnaut, “How China Interferes in Australia: And How Democracies Can Push Back,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot , March 9, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-03-09/how-china-interferes-australia (accessed on February 13, 2019) 15 Doina Chiacu, “China trying to sway U.S. vote, poses threat: officials,” Reuters, October 10, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-china/china-trying-to-sway-u-s-vote-poses-threat-officials-idUSKCN1MK1SJ (accessed on April 3, 2019) 16 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution , Portfolio Penguin, 2016; Idem, Shaping the Future of the Fourth Industrial Revolution , Portfolio Penguin, 2018. 17 Satoru Mori, “U.S. Defense Innovation and Artificial Intelligence,” Asia Pacific Review , Vol.25, No.2 (2018). 18 John Chipman, “China’s long and winding Digital Silk Road,” IISS Analysis, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 25, 2019, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/01/china-digital-silk-road (accessed on April 7, 2019); Brian Harding, “China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia,” CSIS Commentary, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 15, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-and-southeast-asia (accessed on March 11, 2019) 19 Bonnie Girard, “The Real Danger of China’s National Intelligence Law,” The Diplomat , February 23, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/the-real-danger-of-chinas-national-intelligence-law/ (accessed on April 7, 2019) 20 Jeremy Page, Kate O’Keeffe, and Rob Taylor, “America’s Undersea Battle With China for Control of the Global Internet Grid,” The Wall Street Journal , March 12, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-takes-on-chinas-huawei-in-undersea-battle-over-the-global-internet-grid-11552407466 (accessed on April 7, 2019) 21 See Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s speech on the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. U.S. Department of State, “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” July 30, 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm (accessed on April 7, 2019) 22 David E. Sanger, Julian E. Barnes, Raymond Zhong and Marc Santora, “In 5G Race With China, U.S. Pushes Allies to Fight Huawei,” The New York Times , January 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/huawei-china-us-5g-technology.html (accessed on March 11, 2019) Page, O’Keeffe, and Taylor, “America’s Undersea Battle With China.” 23 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei ban won’t make the US fall behind in 5G technology, experts say,” CNBC Online, March 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/06/huawei-ban-wont-make-the-us-fall-behind-in-5g-experts.html (accessed on April 7, 2019) 24 Elsa Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power (Washington D.C.: Center for a New American Security, November 2017); John K. Costello and Elsa Kania, “Quantum Technologies, U.S.-China Strategic Competition, and Future Dynamics of Cyber Stability,” CyCon U.S. , November 7, 2017; Elsa Kania, “Strategic Innovation and Great Power Competition,” The Strategy Bridge , January 31, 2018. 25 Kania, Battlefield Singularity, 19-21. 26 Kania, “Strategic Innovation and Great Power Competition.” 27 Kania, Battlefield Singularity , 10-11. See footnote k in particular for details of recent examples of China’s “going out” strategy in implementation. 28 Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh, China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable a Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation , Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, February 2017, 7-9. 29 Ibid., 15-19. 30 The English translated version “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” by a group of experts can be found at https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/translation-fulltext-8.1.17.pdf . Other official strategic plans include Made in China 2025 (May 2015), the “Internet Plus” Artificial Intelligence Three-Year Action Implementation Plan (May 2016), and the 13 th Five-Year National Science and Technology Innovation Plan (August 2016). 31 “The Artificial Intelligence Development Plan.” 32 Ibid. 33 Kania, Battlefield Singularity , 12. 34 Costello and Kania, “Quantum Technologies,” 89. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid., 94. 37 “Defense Innovation Initiative,” Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to Deputy Secretary of Defense et al., November 15, 2014, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/OSD013411-14.pdf (accessed on April 19, 2019) 38 Robert Work, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 28, 2016. 39 Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Autonomy (June 2016). 40 SCO was established in 2012 by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and later formalized through DoD Directive 5105.86 dated November 14, 2016. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5105.86, “Director, Strategic Capabilities Office,” November 14, 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510586_dodd_2016.pdf 41 According to its Request for Information, the LRRDP sought “i) relatively mature technologies that may be applied in novel or unique ways to field a fundamentally different type of system capability, ii) emerging technologies that can be rapidly matured to offer new military capability or iii) technologies under development for, or being applied in, non-defense applications which can be repurposed to offer a new military capability.” Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments et al. “Long Range Research and Development Plan (LRRDP) Direction and Tasking,” October 29, 2014, http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/LRRDP_DirectionandTaskingMemoClean.pdf ; “Long Range Research and Development Plan (LRRDP) Request for Information,” http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/offsetrfi1203.pdf . 42 U.S. Department of Defense, “Redesignation of the Defense Innovation Unit,” Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense and the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, August 3, 2018, https://s3.amazonaws.com/fedscoopwp-media/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/09122501/REDESIGNATION-OF-THE-DEFENSE-INNOVATION-UNIT-OSD009277-18-RES-FINAL.pdf (accessed on April 19, 2019) 43 DIUx consists of three teams – the Engagement team which facilitates a two-way exchange between the military and the entrepreneurs, the Foundry team which brings together internal and external engineers to work on maturing technologies for their focused design sprints, rapid prototyping and field trials, and the Venture team which identifies emerging commercial technologies and explores their applicability to potential military and civilian customers across the department. U.S Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Speech – Remarks on Opening DIUx East and Announcing the Defense Innovation Board,” July 26, 2016, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/858155/remarks-on-opening-diux-east-and-announcing-the-defense-innovation-board/ . 44 These efforts involved assessing the need for policy and regulatory changes, training the workforce on how to access commercial technology and products with existing authorities, expanding databases to make available a catalogue of applicable technologies identified by acquisition and science and technology personnel in U.S. embassies and overseas locations, identifying opportunities for foreign technology solutions to solve sustainment and obsolescence challenges, and enhancing international acquisition and exportability training for personnel not in international acquisition coded positions. Memorandum from the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, “Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0,” April 9, 2015. 45 Reinvigorating prototyping and experimentation provided “Warfighters with the opportunity to explore novel operational concepts, supported key elements of the industrial base, and hedged against threat developments and surprises by reducing the lead time to develop and field new capabilities.” Implementing MOSA was expected to enhance technology insertion especially in the most rapidly advancing areas of commercial technology such as microelectronics, sensors, and software, and allow “both pre-planned and opportunistic technology based upgrades in the areas of technology that are most subject to change.” Ibid., pp.12, 15. 46 Ibid, p.3. 47 U.S. House of Representatives, the Committee on Armed Services, “Statement by Dr. Mike Griffin,” April 17, 2018, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180417/108132/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-GriffinM-20180417.pdf (accessed on April 10, 2019) 48 The Department of Defense’s Science and Technology (S&T) community issued the Reliance 21 document in January 2014. This provided the overarching framework of the Department’s S&T joint planning and coordination process and identified several priority areas, including autonomy, counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cyber, big data, and electronic warfare/protection. In May 2014, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (R&E) issued another document titled DoD Research and Engineering Enterprise. This guidance stated that one of the three principles of the defense R&E enterprise was to create technological surprise; it listed autonomy, quantum sciences, human systems, and nanoengineering/nanotechnology as areas of interest. The National Science and Technology Council’s Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Subcommittee issued the National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan in October 2016. Yet this plan made only passing reference to defense applications of artificial intelligence. 49 The AI Select Committee is headed by Michael Kratsios, deputy assistant to the president for technology policy, NSF Director France Cordova, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Director Steven Walker. Walter Copan, NIST director and Commerce Department undersecretary for standards and technology, Michael Griffin, Defense Department’s undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, Paul Dabbar, undersecretary for science at the Energy Department, and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency Director Jason Matheny are also members of the committee. 50 Aaron Boyd, “Here’s What the White House’s AI Committee Will Focus On,” Defense One , June 29, 2018, at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/06/heres-what-white-houses-ai-committee-will-focus/149391/?oref=d-river The MLAI Subcommittee is made up of deputies and assistant directors, led by Office of Science and Technology Policy Assistant Director for Artificial Intelligence Jim Kurose, National Science Foundation Assistant Director for Computer and Information Science and Engineering Erwin Gianchandani, National Institute of Standards and Technology Director of the Information Technology Laboratory Chuck Romine and Energy Department Office of Science Deputy Director J. Stephen Binkley. 51 The White House, “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” February 11, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining-american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/ (accessed on April 18, 2019) 52 “Establishment of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center,” Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense et al., June 27, 2018, https://admin.govexec.com/media/establishment_of_the_joint_artificial_intelligence_center_osd008412-18_r … .pdf (accessed on April 15, 2019) 53 U.S. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: 2018 DoD Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity,” undated, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088964/-1/-1/1/DOD-AI-STRATEGY-FACT-SHEET.PDF (accessed on April 15, 2019) 54 Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, “DARPA Announces $2 Billion Campaign to Develop Next Wave of AI Technologies,” September 7, 2018. https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-09-07 55 DARPA has sought to fund various quantum technologies through the Quantum Entanglement Science and Technology (QuEST) program established in 2008. The Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency (IARPA), the Department of Energy, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the National Science Foundation have also invested in quantum information science. Costello and Kania, “Quantum Technologies,” 90-91. 56 Ibid., 91. 57 U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge , https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed on March 8, 2019) 58 USTR, Section 301 Findings , pp.10-13. The USTR defines its understanding of China’s IDAR approach as follows: Introduce : Chinese companies should target and acquire foreign technology. Methods of “introducing” foreign technology that are specifically referenced include: technology transfer agreements, inbound investment, technology imports, establishing foreign R&D centers, outbound investment, and the collection of market intelligence by state entities for the benefit of Chinese companies. Technology to be “introduced” from overseas includes “major equipment that cannot yet be supplied domestically,” as well as “advanced design and manufacturing technology”, conversely, the government discourages imports of technologies for which China is already deemed to “possess domestic R&D capabilities.” Digest : Following the acquisition of foreign technology, the Chinese government should collaborate with China’s domestic industry to collect, analyze, and disseminate the information and technology that has been acquired. Absorb : The Chinese government and China’s domestic industry should collaborate to develop products using the technology that has been acquired. The Chinese government should provide financial assistance to develop products using technology obtained through IDAR, including foreign trade development funds, government procurement, and fiscal incentives. To absorb foreign technologies authorities have established engineering research centers, enterprise-based technology centers, state laboratories, national technology transfer centers, and high-technology service centers. Re-innovate : At this stage, Chinese companies should “re-innovate” and improve upon the foreign technology. The ultimate objective is to develop new, home-grown products that are competitive internationally, so as to “allow enterprises to possess more indigenous intellectual property for core products and core technologies.” 59 USTR, Section 301 Findings , pp.14-15. 60 Ibid, p.17. 61 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China , pp.35-36 (accessed on April 9, 2019) 62 The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property website, http://ipcommission.org/ (accessed on April 9, 2019) 63 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 301 Findings) , March 22, 2018, p.4, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF (accessed on March 12, 2019). 64 Ibid. 65 USTR, Section 301 Findings Executive Summary , p.iii. 66 Ibid, p.iv. 67 Ibid, p.vi. 68 Ibid, p.vii. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid, p.viii. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid, p.x. 74 Ibid, p.xi. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid, p.xii. 77 USTR, Section 301 Findings , pp.177-181. 78 White House, National Security Strategy , p. ; White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World , June 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf (accessed on March 11, 2019) 79 FIRRMA which is Subtitle A of Title XVII of Public Law 115-232 (Aug. 13, 2018), amended section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA). 80 Section 1702 of FIRRMA adds the following national security considerations: whether a covered transaction involves a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or declared strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure that would affect United States leadership in areas related to national security; the potential national security-related effects of the cumulative control of, or pattern of recent transactions involving, any one type of critical infrastructure, energy asset, critical material, or critical technology by a foreign government or foreign person; whether any foreign person engaging in a covered transaction with a United States business has a history of complying with United States laws and regulations; the control of United States industries and commercial activity by foreign persons as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national security, including the availability of human resources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies and services, and in considering ‘‘the availability of human resources’’, should construe that term to include potential losses of such availability resulting from reductions in the employment of United States persons whose knowledge or skills are critical to national security, including the continued production in the United States of items that are likely to be acquired by the Department of Defense or other Federal departments or agencies for the advancement of the national security of the United States; the extent to which a covered transaction is likely to expose, either directly or indirectly, personally identifiable information, genetic information, or other sensitive data of United States citizens to access by a foreign government or foreign person that may exploit that information in a manner that threatens national security; and whether a covered transaction is likely to have the effect of exacerbating or creating new cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the United States or is likely to result in a foreign government gaining a significant new capability to engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities against the United States, including such activities designed to affect the outcome of any election for Federal office. 81 Section 1703 defines the 6 kinds of critical technologies as: (i) Defense articles or defense services, (ii) Items included on the Commerce Control List set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 774 of the Export Administration Regulations, (iii) nuclear equipment, parts and components, materials, software, and technology related to assistance to foreign atomic energy activities, (iv) nuclear facilities, equipment, and material relating to export and import of nuclear equipment and material, (v) select agents and toxins, (vi) Emerging and foundational technologies controlled pursuant to section 1758 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. 82 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Interim Regulations for FIRRMA Pilot Program,” October 10, 2018. 83 Office of Investment Security, Department of the Treasury, “Determination and Temporary Provisions Pertaining to a Pilot Program To Review Certain Transactions Involving Foreign Persons and Critical Technologies,” Federal Register, October 11, 2018, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/10/11/2018-22182/determination-and-temporary-provisions-pertaining-to-a-pilot-program-to-review-certain-transactions#sectno-reference-801.403 (accessed on April 11, 2019) 84 Bureau of Industry and Security, “Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” Federal Register , November 19, 2018. 85 Ibid. 86 US Department of Justice, “Attorney General Jeff Session’s China Initiative Fact Sheet,” November 1, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/download (accessed on April 11, 2019) 87 Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, “Visa Restrictions for Chinese Students Alarm Academia,” The New York Times , July 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/visa-restrictions-chinese-students.html (accessed on April 11, 2019); Anthony Carpaccio, “U.S. Faces ‘Unprecedented Threat’ From China on Tech Takeover,” Bloomberg , June 22, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-22/china-s-thousand-talents-called-key-in-seizing-u-s-expertise (accessed on April 11, 2019); Jeff Mason and Eric Walsh, “U.S. to shorten length of visas for some Chinese citizens: White House,” Reuters , May 30, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-visas/u-s-to-shorten-length-of-visas-for-some-chinese-citizens-ap-idUSKCN1IV00H (accessed on April 11, 2019) 88 The White House, Memorandum on “FY2020 Administration Research and Development Budget Priorities,” July 31, 2018. 89 Ibid. 90 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “China’s digital silk road,” HSBC, May 14, 2018, https://www.business.hsbc.com/belt-and-road/chinas-digital-silk-road (accessed on April 14, 2019); Rachel Brown, “Beijing’s Silk Road Goes Global,” Council on Foreign Relations Blog, June 6, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/beijings-silk-road-goes-digital (accessed on April 14, 2019) 91 Ibid. 92 World Economic Forum and Observer Research Foundation (WEF/ORF), “China is building a new Silk Road, and this one is digital,” World Economic Forum website, August 18, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/china-is-building-a-new-silk-road-and-this-one-s-digital/ (accessed on November 22, 2018) 93 Ibid. 94 Chipman, “China’s long and winding Digital Silk Road.” 95 Cases were collected from multiple sources. WEF/ORF, “China is building a new Silk Road”; EIU, “China’s digital silk road”; Brian Harding, “China’s Digital Silk Road and Southeast Asia,” CSIS Commentary, February 19, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road-and-southeast-asia (accessed on March 1, 2019); Sheridan Prasso, “China’s Digital Silk Road Is Looking More Like and Iron Curtain,” Bloomberg Businessweek, January 10, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-01-10/china-s-digital-silk-road-is-looking-more-like-an-iron-curtain (accessed on April 14, 2019); Jeremy Page, Kate O’Keeffe, and Rob Taylor, “America’s Undersea Battle with China for Control of the Global Internet Grid,” Wall Street Journal , March 12, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-takes-on-chinas-huawei-in-undersea-battle-over-the-global-internet-grid-11552407466 (accessed on April 14, 2019) 96 Page et al., “America’s Undersea Battle with China.” 97 U.S. Department of Defense, Assessment on U.S. Defense Implications of China’s Expanding Global Access , December 2018, p.13, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/14/2002079292/-1/-1/1/EXPANDING-GLOBAL-ACCESS-REPORT-FINAL.PDF (accessed on March 11, 2019) 98 Ibid. 99 USCC, 2018 Annual Report , p.461. 100 Ibid, p.461. 101 Ibid, p.462. 102 Ibid, p.466. 103 James A. Lewis, How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security: A Primer , Center for Strategic and International Studies Technology Policy Program, December 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181206_Lewis_5GPrimer_WEB.pdf (accessed on January 15, 2019) 104 Lewis, How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security , p.6. 105 Lewis points out that “[s]emiconductors are the most important components of 5G technologies and American companies are still the major suppliers. Ibid, p.6, 8. 106 USCC, 2018 Annual Report, p.466. 107 Lewis, How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security , p. 9. 108 Ibid, p.467. 109 Lewis, How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security , p. 11. 110 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks on ‘America’s Indo-Pacific Vision’,” July 30, 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm (accessed on April 14) 111 U.S. Department of State, “Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region – Fact Sheet,” November 18, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/11/287433.htm (accessed on March 11, 2019) 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Page et al, “America’s Undersea Battle with China.” 115 Section 889, The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act of 2019. 116 David E. Sanger, Julian E. Barnes, Raymond Zhong and Marc Santora, “America Pushes Allies to Fight Huawei in New Arms Race with China,” The New York Times , January 26, 2019. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 Jeremy Horwitz, “U.S. shifts to require strict 5G security from allies, not Huawei bans,” VentureBeat , April 8, 2019, https://venturebeat.com/2019/04/08/u-s-shifts-to-require-strict-5g-security-from-allies-not-huawei-bans/ (accessed on April 14, 2019) It was reported that “while the United States hasn’t retracted or reduced its allegations against Huawei, Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reports that senior U.S. officials have embraced a German-developed plan to make domestic 5G security standards ‘so strict regardless of the provider that unreliable companies have no chance.’ Under this plan, Germany will reject 5G components from any hardware provider that could be forced by a foreign power to undermine German security, and use parts solely from “trusted suppliers.” 120 USTR, Section 301 Findings , p.8. 121 Michael J. Abramowitz, “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis,” Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 . See also Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect,” Journal of Democracy 27 (July 2016): 5–17. The Chinese government also provides other governments with technology and expertise on how to control their own citizens by exporting the technology and providing training for online opinion manipulation, creating concerns for the spread of “digital authoritarianism.” Michael Abramowitz and Michael Chertoff, “The global threat of China’s digital authoritarianism,” The Washington Post , November 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-global-threat-of-chinas-digital-authoritarianism/2018/11/01/46d6d99c-dd40-11e8-b3f0-62607289efee_story.html?utm_term=.56ae16e4d7f0 (accessed on April 9, 2019) 122 Nicholas Wright, “How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order: The Coming Competition Between Digital Authoritarianism and Liberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot , July 10, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-07-10/how-artificial-intelligence-will-reshape-global-order (accessed on April 18, 2019) 123 James A. Lewis, “Technological Competition and China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2018. Publisher Copyright: © 2019, © 2019 Nakasone Peace Institute.
PY - 2019/1/2
Y1 - 2019/1/2
N2 - The US approach toward China shifted from engagement to competition, and it has coincided with the near-simultaneous breakthrough of advanced technologies in a whole host of areas ranging from artificial intelligence to synthetic biology. As a result, the United States is competing with China to apply these advanced technologies for military and industrial purposes, and, at the same time, competing in third countries over dominance in digital network infrastructure. The current article will illustrate Chinese efforts and US countermeasures that are unfolding in the form of military technological competition, industrial technological competition, and the digital network competition in order to argue that the US shift toward competition is not only about Chinese discriminatory and unreasonable acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer and cyber intrusions, but a contest for supremacy over the next generation of military, economic and information/data dominance that could impact the relative legitimacy of political and socio-economic system of the two states.
AB - The US approach toward China shifted from engagement to competition, and it has coincided with the near-simultaneous breakthrough of advanced technologies in a whole host of areas ranging from artificial intelligence to synthetic biology. As a result, the United States is competing with China to apply these advanced technologies for military and industrial purposes, and, at the same time, competing in third countries over dominance in digital network infrastructure. The current article will illustrate Chinese efforts and US countermeasures that are unfolding in the form of military technological competition, industrial technological competition, and the digital network competition in order to argue that the US shift toward competition is not only about Chinese discriminatory and unreasonable acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer and cyber intrusions, but a contest for supremacy over the next generation of military, economic and information/data dominance that could impact the relative legitimacy of political and socio-economic system of the two states.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074647034&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85074647034&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/13439006.2019.1622871
DO - 10.1080/13439006.2019.1622871
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85074647034
SN - 1343-9006
VL - 26
SP - 77
EP - 120
JO - Asia-Pacific Review
JF - Asia-Pacific Review
IS - 1
ER -