Using Game Theory to Examine Incentives in Influenza Vaccination Behavior

Gretchen B. Chapman, Meng Li, Jeffrey Vietri, Yoko Ibuka, David Thomas, Haewon Yoon, Alison P. Galvani

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

37 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The social good often depends on the altruistic behavior of specific individuals. For example, epidemiological studies of influenza indicate that elderly individuals, who face the highest mortality risk, are best protected by vaccination of young individuals, who contribute most to disease transmission. To examine the conditions under which young people would get vaccinated to protect elderly people, we conducted a game-theory experiment that mirrored real-world influenza transmission, with "young" players contributing more than "elderly" players to herd immunity. Participants could spend points to get vaccinated and reduce the risk of influenza. When players were paid according to individual point totals, more elderly than young players got vaccinated, a finding consistent with the Nash equilibrium predicting self-interested behavior. When players were paid according to group point totals, however, more young than elderly players got vaccinated-a finding consistent with the utilitarian equilibrium predicting group-optimal behavior-which resulted in higher point totals than when players were paid for their individual totals. Thus, payout structure affected whether individuals got vaccinated for self-interest or group benefit.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1008-1015
Number of pages8
JournalPsychological Science
Volume23
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Game Theory
Human Influenza
Motivation
Vaccination
Herd Immunity
Public Opinion
Epidemiologic Studies
Mortality

Keywords

  • decision making
  • health
  • social cognition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Psychology(all)

Cite this

Chapman, G. B., Li, M., Vietri, J., Ibuka, Y., Thomas, D., Yoon, H., & Galvani, A. P. (2012). Using Game Theory to Examine Incentives in Influenza Vaccination Behavior. Psychological Science, 23(9), 1008-1015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612437606

Using Game Theory to Examine Incentives in Influenza Vaccination Behavior. / Chapman, Gretchen B.; Li, Meng; Vietri, Jeffrey; Ibuka, Yoko; Thomas, David; Yoon, Haewon; Galvani, Alison P.

In: Psychological Science, Vol. 23, No. 9, 2012, p. 1008-1015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Chapman, GB, Li, M, Vietri, J, Ibuka, Y, Thomas, D, Yoon, H & Galvani, AP 2012, 'Using Game Theory to Examine Incentives in Influenza Vaccination Behavior', Psychological Science, vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 1008-1015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612437606
Chapman, Gretchen B. ; Li, Meng ; Vietri, Jeffrey ; Ibuka, Yoko ; Thomas, David ; Yoon, Haewon ; Galvani, Alison P. / Using Game Theory to Examine Incentives in Influenza Vaccination Behavior. In: Psychological Science. 2012 ; Vol. 23, No. 9. pp. 1008-1015.
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