Voluntary disclosure of information and cooperation in simultaneous-move economic interactions

Kenju Kamei

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper experimentally studies individuals’ voluntary disclosure of past behaviors and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under certain conditions, although a non-negligible fraction of individuals do not disclose information about the past and proceed to behave opportunistically. On closer inspection, the data revealed that the material incentives of disclosure acts differ according to the matching protocol. Specifically, disclosers receive higher payoffs than non-disclosers if the disclosers are assured to be matched with like-minded disclosers; conversely, disclosers are vulnerable to exploitation by others under random matching. These results suggest that mandatory disclosure helps enhance economic efficiency if individuals’ hiding and uncooperative behaviors are liable to precipitate a collapse in the community norms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)234-246
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume171
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Mar
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Dilemma
  • Experiment
  • Information disclosure
  • Repeated games
  • Reputation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Voluntary disclosure of information and cooperation in simultaneous-move economic interactions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this