von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game

The existence proof

Toshiyuki Hirai, Naoki Watanabe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides the existence proof for stable sets of a game which may have empty cores. Given the number of licensees of a patented technology which is determined by the patent holder without any production facilities, a game with a coalition structure is formulated with the outcome expected in the subsequent market competition where any cartels are prohibited. Although the core is non-empty if and only if the grand coalition is formed with a condition, we provide, for each permissible coalition structure, the sufficient condition(s) for the existence of von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of the game. Under symmetric imputations, there exist stable sets for any permissible coalition structures, and each of those is completely characterized.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-12
Number of pages12
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume94
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Jul 1

Fingerprint

Stable Set
Patents
Licensure
Coalitions
patent
coalition
Game
Technology
Grand Coalition
Imputation
market
If and only if
Haemophilus influenzae type b-polysaccharide vaccine-diphtheria toxoid conjugate
Patent licensing
Stable set
Coalition structure
Sufficient Conditions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game : The existence proof. / Hirai, Toshiyuki; Watanabe, Naoki.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 94, 01.07.2018, p. 1-12.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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