TY - JOUR
T1 - When do people visit a doctor?
AU - Bessho, Shun Ichiro
AU - Ohkusa, Yasushi
N1 - Funding Information:
The data used had been collected by Yasushi Ohkusa, financed by the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science (2000 Scientific Research Grant, titled “Evaluation for Economic Institution Based on Empirical Research for Household Behavior” (grant number:12124207), headed by Fumio Hayashi of the University of Tokyo. We gratefully acknowledge the comments by two anonymous referees, Toshihiro Ihori, Masayo Sato, Masayoshi Hayashi, Kiyoshi Mitsui, Masako Ii, Hiromi Hara, Yusuke Ono, Ryoko Morozumi and seminar participants at ISER Osaka University and Yokohama National University. The usual disclaimer applies.
PY - 2006/2
Y1 - 2006/2
N2 - We examine the length of time between when an individual feels sick and when he/she visits a doctor using survival analysis to capture the dynamic aspects of this behavior. If the disease is light, actions such as OTC medicine or sick leave are alternatives to visiting a clinic or a hospital immediately. The timing of the visit depends only the person's decision, not on a doctor's, so we can limit discussion to the effect of ex-post moral hazard excluding physician induced demand. Participants were asked to keep a log of illness-related behavior such as dates of episodes, subjective symptoms, sick leaves, and medical treatment at hospitals. Neither the copayment rate nor access cost had a significant effect on the behavior of visiting a doctor, whereas available alternatives delay the timing of a visiting. Severe symptoms and fever hastened the time. The results suggest that the traditional argument about ex-post moral hazard is somewhat misleading.
AB - We examine the length of time between when an individual feels sick and when he/she visits a doctor using survival analysis to capture the dynamic aspects of this behavior. If the disease is light, actions such as OTC medicine or sick leave are alternatives to visiting a clinic or a hospital immediately. The timing of the visit depends only the person's decision, not on a doctor's, so we can limit discussion to the effect of ex-post moral hazard excluding physician induced demand. Participants were asked to keep a log of illness-related behavior such as dates of episodes, subjective symptoms, sick leaves, and medical treatment at hospitals. Neither the copayment rate nor access cost had a significant effect on the behavior of visiting a doctor, whereas available alternatives delay the timing of a visiting. Severe symptoms and fever hastened the time. The results suggest that the traditional argument about ex-post moral hazard is somewhat misleading.
KW - Copayment rate
KW - Ex-post moral hazard
KW - Health care demand
KW - Survival analysis
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U2 - 10.1007/s10729-006-6276-8
DO - 10.1007/s10729-006-6276-8
M3 - Article
C2 - 16613013
AN - SCOPUS:32444434590
SN - 1386-9620
VL - 9
SP - 5
EP - 18
JO - Health Care Management Science
JF - Health Care Management Science
IS - 1
ER -