A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

研究成果: Article査読

17 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We consider a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms where each firm's preferences satisfy substitutability, increasing choice and no external effect by unchosen workers, which are defined by Bando (2012). We first illustrate that a sequential version of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm with worker-proposing may not find a worker-optimal quasi stable matching. Then, we provide a modified DA algorithm in which (i) each worker simultaneously proposes to his most preferred firm that has not rejected him and (ii) each firm chooses its acceptable workers from the cumulative set of workers who have ever proposed to it, assuming that the other workers proposing to its rival firms are hired. We show that this algorithm finds a worker-optimal quasi stable matching. We also show that this algorithm can be generalized into a fixed point algorithm.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)173-181
ページ数9
ジャーナルJournal of Mathematical Economics
52
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 5月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 応用数学

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