A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods

Keisuke Bando, Kenzo Imamura

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We consider an allocation problem with indivisible goods, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonic allocation rules under non-wastefulness. The condition is based on robustness to group manipulation. Specifically, we introduce a new condition called the no improvement property of unmatched agents which means that unmatched agents cannot be strictly better off through any group manipulation. We show that a non-wasteful allocation rule satisfies weak Maskin monotonicity if and only if it satisfies the no improvement property of unmatched agents and weak group strategy-proofness. In addition, together with our result and that of Kojima and Manea (Econometrica 78:633–653, 2010), the deferred acceptance (DA) rules with acceptant substitutable priorities are characterized based on the conditions related to robustness to group manipulation.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)589-606
ページ数18
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
47
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2016 10月 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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