TY - JOUR
T1 - A note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms
AU - Matsubayashi, Nobuo
AU - Yamada, Yoshiyasu
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Barnett Parker and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. The first author is supported by the Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) 18710138 of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan.
PY - 2008/6/1
Y1 - 2008/6/1
N2 - This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers' loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers' price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers' sensitivity as well as lower consumers' loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms' equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm's profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.
AB - This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint. Consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level; therefore, two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits. The asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers' loyalty to each firm; that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms. Our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers' price- and quality-sensitivity. In doing so, we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition. We show that in both the moderately quality-sensitive and price-sensitive markets, higher consumers' sensitivity as well as lower consumers' loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition, resulting in a decrease of both firms' equilibrium profits. On the other hand, in highly quality-sensitive market, asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy. In general, this is more beneficial to the larger firm, as the smaller firm's profit tends to decline. In the worst case, the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium.
KW - Consumers' loyalty
KW - Consumers' sensitivity
KW - Economics
KW - Non-cooperative game
KW - Price and quality competition
KW - Vertical and horizontal differentiation
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U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.03.021
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.03.021
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:36048997478
VL - 187
SP - 571
EP - 581
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
SN - 0377-2217
IS - 2
ER -