A note on the profit distribution among a manufacturer and its retailers

研究成果: Article

抄録

Examining two polar forms of restricted franchise contract, Nariu (2004) studied the pricing behavior of manufacturers and retailers and the market outcomes. This note provides a concise justification for his assumptions on contractual restraints. Introducing some fixed amount that a manufacturer must invest to build up its production facility, we show that a bargaining solution to distribute the total net profit among a manufacturer and its exclusive retailers assigns zero franchise fee payment to any retailers, if the investment is not large.

元の言語English
ジャーナルEconomics Bulletin
12
発行部数1
出版物ステータスPublished - 2005
外部発表Yes

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Retailers
Profit
Franchise
Fees
Pricing behaviour
Justification
Bargaining solutions
Payment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

これを引用

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