A two-sided discrete-concave market with possibly bounded side payments: An approach by discrete convex analysis

Satoru Fujishige, Akihisa Tamura

研究成果: Article査読

37 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The marriage model due to Gale and Shapley [Gale, D., L. S. Shapley. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69 9-15] and the assignment model due to Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L. S., M. Shubik. 1972. The assignment game I: The core. Internat. J. Game Theory 1 111-130] are standard in the theory of two-sided matching markets. We give a common generalization of these models by utilizing discrete-concave functions and considering possibly bounded side payments. We show the existence of a pairwise stable outcome in our model. Our present model is a further natural extension of the model examined in our previous paper [Fujishige, S., A. Tamura. A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions. Discrete Appl. Math. 154 950-970], and the proof of the existence of a pairwise stable outcome is even simpler than the previous one.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)136-155
ページ数20
ジャーナルMathematics of Operations Research
32
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 2月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 数学 (全般)
  • コンピュータ サイエンスの応用
  • 経営科学およびオペレーションズ リサーチ

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