An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment

Noriaki Okamoto

研究成果: Article査読

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)555-560
ページ数6
ジャーナルAmerican Economic Review
108
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 2月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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