An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

研究成果: Article査読

13 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In a single item auction model that allows non-quasilinear preferences, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak envy-freeness for equals, strategy-proofness, and nonimposition if and only if it is a (generalized) second price auction. This characterization is established on a wide class of preference domains, including the quasilinear domain, a positive income effect domain, and a negative income effect domain.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)17-26
ページ数10
ジャーナルReview of Economic Design
17
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 1 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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