TY - JOUR
T1 - Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
AU - Sakai, Toyotaka
PY - 2013/9/1
Y1 - 2013/9/1
N2 - In single-item auctions, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-imposition if and only if it is either a second price auction with a reserve price or the no-trade rule. In this characterization, any reserve price is endogenously derived from the three axioms. We also analyze relations between equity and efficiency axioms, and obtain alternative characterizations.
AB - In single-item auctions, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-imposition if and only if it is either a second price auction with a reserve price or the no-trade rule. In this characterization, any reserve price is endogenously derived from the three axioms. We also analyze relations between equity and efficiency axioms, and obtain alternative characterizations.
KW - Market design
KW - No-trade rule
KW - Reserve price
KW - Second price auction
KW - Strategy-proofness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84882950699&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84882950699&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12018.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2013.12018.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84882950699
SN - 1742-7355
VL - 9
SP - 255
EP - 265
JO - International Journal of Economic Theory
JF - International Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 3
ER -