Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price

研究成果: Article査読

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In single-item auctions, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-imposition if and only if it is either a second price auction with a reserve price or the no-trade rule. In this characterization, any reserve price is endogenously derived from the three axioms. We also analyze relations between equity and efficiency axioms, and obtain alternative characterizations.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)255-265
ページ数11
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Economic Theory
9
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 9 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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