Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market

Shin Kishimoto, Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto

研究成果: Article査読

11 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an external patent holder to firms in a general Cournot market. Our results are as follows: when the number of firms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder should extract the entire profits of all licensees. The outcome that the bargaining finally reaches exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable. The fair allocation represented by the Aumann-Drèze value is, however, not realized as such a stable bargaining outcome.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)114-123
ページ数10
ジャーナルMathematical social sciences
61
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 3
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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