Budgets under delegation

Kimiko Terai, Amihai Glazer

研究成果: Chapter

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Consider a principal who sets a budget that the agent allocates among different services. Because the preferences of the agent may differ from those of the principal, the budget the principal sets can be lower or higher than in the first-best solution. When the principal is uncertain about the agent’s preferences, the agent may choose an allocation that signals his type, thereby affecting the size of the budget the principal will set in the following period. The equilibrium may have separation or pooling. In a pooling equilibrium, the agent may mis-represent his preferences, aiming to get a large budget in the future period.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルAdvances in Japanese Business and Economics
出版社Springer
ページ167-192
ページ数26
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2015

出版物シリーズ

名前Advances in Japanese Business and Economics
8
ISSN(印刷版)2197-8859
ISSN(電子版)2197-8867

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

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