College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler, Morimitsu Kurino

研究成果: Article査読

14 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)886-934
ページ数49
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
176
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 7月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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