Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs

Yuncheol Jeong, Masayoshi Maruyama

研究成果: Article査読

9 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper studies decisions by firms of whether to attempt "behavior-based" price discrimination in markets with switching costs by using a two-period duopoly model. When both firms commit themselves to a pricing policy and consumers are "sophisticated" and have rational expectations, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium with both firms engaging in uniform pricing. Both firms are better off in the uniform pricing equilibrium, compared with the discriminatory equilibrium.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)45-66
ページ数22
ジャーナルJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
98
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネス、管理および会計(全般)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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