@article{05a2add8c6a147ec9553ecb5dffc73bb,
title = "Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders",
abstract = "We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which multiple symmetric senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about their respective proposal qualities. We show that a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique. We then show that as the number of senders increases, each sender discloses information more aggressively, and full disclosure by each sender arises in the limit of infinitely many senders.",
keywords = "Bayesian persuasion, Information transmission, Multiple senders",
author = "Au, {Pak Hung} and Keiichi Kawai",
note = "Funding Information: We are grateful to the editor and three anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions and valuable comments. The second author greatly acknowledges the financial support from UNSW Sydney and Australian Research Council (DECRA Grant RG160734). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2020",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.002",
language = "English",
volume = "119",
pages = "56--78",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}