Computational semantics for first-order logical analysis of cryptographic protocols

Gergei Bana, Koji Hasebe, Mitsuhiro Okada

研究成果: Conference contribution

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic As opposed to earlier treatments, we introduce a new, fully probabilistic method to assign computational semantics to the syntax. The idea is to make use of the usual mathematical treatment of stochastic processes, hence be able to treat arbitrary probability distributions, non-negligible probability of collision, causal dependence or independence, and so on. We present this via considering a simple example of such a formal model, the Basic Protocol Logic by K. Hasebe and M. Okada [20], but we think the technique is suitable for a wide range of formal methods for protocol correctness proofs. We first review our framework of proof-system, BPL, for proving correctness of authentication protocols, and provide computational semantics. Then we give a full proof of the soundness theorem. We also comment on the differences of our method and that of Computational PCL.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルFormal to Practical Security
ホスト出版物のサブタイトルPapers Issued from the 2005-2008 French-Japanese Collaboration
ページ33-56
ページ数24
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 7 16

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
5458 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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