Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

Toru Hokari, Yukihiko Funaki, Peter Sudhölter

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We show that neither Peleg’s nor Tadenuma’s well-known axiomatizations of the core by non-emptiness, individual rationality, super-additivity, and max consistency or complement consistency, respectively, hold when only convex rather than balanced TU games are considered, even if anonymity is required in addition. Moreover, we show that the core and its relative interior are the only two solutions that satisfy Peleg’s axioms together with anonymity and converse max consistency on the domain of convex games.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)187-197
ページ数11
ジャーナルReview of Economic Design
24
3-4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2020 12 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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