Construction of One-Way Car Sharing System Considering Coalition Rationality based on Mechanism Design

Shun Sasaki, Eri Yamamoto, Toru Namerikawa

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

This paper proposes a control algorithm for one-way car sharing. The problem with one-way car sharing is that the origin and the destination parking lots, tend to be biased because user traffic demands, and the cost of relocating the vehicle to increase the operating rate is high. To solve this problem, we propose providing incentives to users in the form of discounts and also changing the parking lots and departure times to prevent bias in the number of vehicles in the parking lots. In this study, based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism design, an incentive design was created to satisfy desirable properties, such as strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and coalition rationality. In the proposed one-way car sharing system, the system manager decides the proposal based on the information reported by the users. Therefore, satisfying these properties not only guarantees not only that the users will benefit from agreeing to the proposal, but also that even in case of a false declaration or shill bidding, the discount will not be unreasonably profitable. Finally, the increase in demand acceptance by applying the proposed method was confirmed by numerical simulation.

本文言語English
ジャーナルIEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
DOI
出版ステータスAccepted/In press - 2022

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 制御およびシステム工学
  • 信号処理
  • コンピュータ ネットワークおよび通信
  • 制御と最適化

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