De-commitment to losing strategic action: Evidence from the divestiture of poorly performing acquisitions

Mathew L.A. Hayward, Katsuhiko Shimizu

研究成果: Review article査読

76 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We use a mental accounting framework to study the conditions in which CEOs de-commit to poorly performing acquisitions and so become more likely to divest them. We test this framework by contrasting the experiences of 68 firms that divested acquisitions with a control sample of 68 firms that did not divest their acquisitions. Consistent with the theory that we use to explain and predict de-commitment, our results suggest that poorly performing acquired units tend to be divested when executives can place them within 'attributional accounts' (i.e., accounts for the cause of the performance that do not incriminate them) and 'comprehensive accounts' (i.e., within the context of overall firm performance).

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)541-557
ページ数17
ジャーナルStrategic Management Journal
27
6
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2006 6月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 戦略と経営

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