Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints

Masahiro Goto, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Article

10 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i.e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property. We also offer a technique to apply ADA even if heredity is violated (e.g., minimum quotas).

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)226-262
ページ数37
ジャーナルAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
9
発行部数2
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2017 5 1

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Fairness
Acceptance
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

これを引用

Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints. / Goto, Masahiro; Kojima, Fuhito; Kurata, Ryoji; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto.

:: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 巻 9, 番号 2, 01.05.2017, p. 226-262.

研究成果: Article

Goto, Masahiro ; Kojima, Fuhito ; Kurata, Ryoji ; Tamura, Akihisa ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints. :: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2017 ; 巻 9, 番号 2. pp. 226-262.
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